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2000, (which coincidentally came into force on the same 
day as the Human Rights Act), the Terrorism Act 2000 which 
I have referred to, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, 
and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Trial by 
jury has been threatened and, following the Auld report, is 
still under threat.
PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
So, to conclude, what are the prospects for civil liberties 
in the present century? On the positive side there are the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Act will be provide 
continuing opportunities for challenging the attacks on 
civil liberties but the deficiencies I have described are likely 
to remain and there seems no early prospect of a distinct 
British Bill of Rights which may be the only way of 
modernising human rights safeguards.
On the negative side is the insecurity of governments,
o J o '
which encourages them to secretive, heavy-handed and 
repressive use of their power. That insecurity is naturally 
intensified by the events of 11 September and the 
widespread belief in a worldwide terrorist network capable 
of unpredictable and devastating violence. In the face of 
such fear, faith in civil liberties is weakened among many 
and to defend them becomes more difficult and more 
unpopular. We are seeing a distressing illustration in the 
USA, where civil liberties have the most powerful legal
safeguards. There is mass support there for attempts by the 
government to circumvent those safeguards by taking 
prisoners outside the jurisdiction, where they are held 
without charge or trial, or access to lawyers, and in 
defiance of the Geneva Conventions. In Britain we have 
not yet gone down the same road.
In between the state and the individual the judges have 
a difficult role. Many deserve credit for their fearlessly 
principled willingness to stand up to government where 
civil liberties are in jeopardy. There is respectable support 
for the view that the judges' constitutional role as the 
protectors of fundamental rights transcend parliamentary 
sovereignty. I refer to the remarks of Lord Justice Laws in 
the case of Witham, which he has elaborated in lectures. 
But a battle between the judiciary and Parliament seems 
unlikely. In the last resort only the people themselves can 
defend their liberties. Whether they will succeed in doing 
so remains to be seen. In short, to conclude with a well- 
worn expression, which, I hope will never become 
obsolete, the jury is still out.
Geoffrey Bindman
Bindman S^Partners
This article is based on a leture given at the IALS on 21 
February 2002. @
The Law Society and the Bar: 
can they be trade unions, 
brand managers and public 
watchdogs at the same time?
by David Lock
The author reflects on the way lawyers are regulated and considers whether, in the 
long run, it is in the public interest for the present system of regulation by 
professional bodies to be continued in its present form.
T he question as to whether professionals can be trusted to regulate themselves in the public interest has come into sharp focus with the 
collapse of Enron and the allegations — to date 
unproved — of collusion by the auditors, Arthur 
Andersen. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been
spent in the US lobbying the senate over decades to 
preserve the right of self-regulation for accountants, 
only to find that the unwise and unauthorised shredding 
of documents by Andersen's appears to have 
fundamentally undermined public confidence in the 
concept of self-regulation.
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One senior US business commentator said recently that 
Enron would have a longer-term impact on western 
capitalism than 'nine-eleven' because the terrible events in 
New York and Washington and the measured response to 
them made the US feel good about its society. In contrast,o J 7
the collapse of Enron left the US public with the feeling 
that self-regulated capitalism was rotten to the core.
This is all about checks and balances. The public, the 
government and business rely on professionals to do their 
job, which includes acting in a predominant way to protect 
the interests they are supposed to be protecting. The 
problem with Enron was that the perception that the 
accountants had been favouring their long-term 
commercial relationship with the management of Enron 
over the interests of stockholders. The allegation was that 
the accountants were more concerned with securing next 
year's audit contract and fees for advisory work flowing out 
of this year's audit, than protecting the shareholders by 
exposing the financial mess at the company.
We must be careful about allegation and countero
allegation in Enron since everyone involved has an interest
o J
to pursue, which may colour their opinion, and support 
their case in court. But there is a growing feeling of distrust 
in the United States of professionals who set the rules in 
which their own members act, and are accountable to no 
one other than the professionals themselves.
What has this to do with the British legal profession? 
Lawyers are self-regulating in this country just as 
accountants are here and in the United States. British 
lawyers are determined to stay self-regulating, and will 
argue vociferously that it is in the public interest that they 
should remain independent and hence self regulating. 
However, it would be difficult to underestimate the 
difference between lawyers' views of themselves and the 
general view of the legal profession amongst the public and 
those elected to Parliament. In a recent Mori poll 78 per 
cent of the public said that nurses were underpaid, 37 per 
cent said doctors were underpaid, and yet only 1 per cent 
said lawyers were underpaid.
REGULATION AND INDEPENDENCE
Lawyers want government to stay out of regulating them 
and to let them get on \\ith their own affairs — they want
o j
to retain the independence of the legal profession. My 
impression from the Houses of Parliament is that the legal1 o
world is still seen as a closed shop, with the lawyers 
running the show, controlling things for their own good
o ' o o o
and not working in the public interest. Is it heresy — as a 
lawyer - to ask what lies at the root of the claim to 
'independence' and the extent to which oversight of that 
independence can be justified? That's the topic I want to 
examine in this article.
The traditional argument is that lawyers must be 
independent of the state even where there is a 
democratically elected government. Lawyers conduct their
profession in an adversarial way and quite often — when 
they represent the poor, the oppressed or the awkward 
squad — their adversary is the government, or one of its 
forms. Should our adversary, the lawyers say, regulate us? 
Should the opposing party to litigation adjudicate the 
conditions in which we work, our ethical standards and the 
complaints against us? Should government dictate the way 
we can attack government — surely that would be the 
beginnings of police state?
That argument is fine — as far as it goes — but there are 
a number of buts. First, there is the legal maxim that no 
man should be judge in his own cause. It is important to 
realise that a properly functioning legal profession is 
important in a civilised society. What lawyers do is 
important and if the legal profession is not effective, the 
whole basis of a rights based society run according to the
O J O
rule of law starts to be undermined.
There is a difference between independence and 
accountability. The claim to independence is entirely 
appropriate until it becomes a thinly disguised plea that 
lawyers should not be accountable to anyone other than 
themselves. What is the difference between beingo
independence and not being accountable?
LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT
The public interest supervision of lawvers is vested in 
the Lord Chancellor.
Until 1972 the Lord Chancellor had an 'office', not a 
Department. Unusually it was staffed by lawyers rather 
than civil servants and was led by a Clerk to the Court in 
Chancery, who also acts as Permanent Secretary. This 
person was required to be a barrister until 1990 and a 
lawyer until 1997. (The present Permanent Secretary, Sir 
Hayden Phillips, is the first non-lawyer to hold the post; 
until the passing of the Supreme Court (Offices) Act 1997 the 
Permanent Secretary, who is also called the Clerk of the 
Crown in Chancery, was required to be a lawyer. Sir 
Hayden was previously the Permanent Secretary at the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport).
One of the first holders of the post was Lord Muir 
MacKenzie, who was in charge from 1880 to 1915. He was1 o
reported to have no use for modern inventions—such as the 
typewriter. He is said to have written all his own letters in 
longhand, directed them himself and refused to keep copies. 
As a result no one else knew what he had promised or agreed.
The lawyers did not see the dominance of lawyers in the 
Lord Chancellor's office as anything usual. However, as 
Robert Stevens observed in his well researched book, 'The 
Independence of the Judiciary' no one would expect the 
Department of Health to be solely staffed by doctors or 
none but service personnel to work at the Ministry of 
Defence. However the lawyers got away with it and no one 
seriously challenged them. It was, as Professor StevensJ o '
notes 'a remarkable example oj professional self regulation .
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But those are the old days and things are different today. 
Just as the Ministry ol Agriculture, Fisheries & Food used 
to be the farmers' voice around the cabinet table, so the 
LCD was the voice of m'learned friends. Now we have the 
Food Standards Agency, and the LCD is talking moreo J ' o
about consumers of legal services and being less focused 
on the interests of the suppliers.
The present Government (and even the last one) has 
been taking a critical look at those areas of legal self-
o o
regulation which are not working well for the people who 
matter — the public. However, the whole issue has been 
dogged by the rejection by lawyers of any role for 
government in overseeing their profession — on the 
grounds that they should remain 'independent'. Language 
is important here. Where does independence end and 
accountability begin? Who looks after the public interest 
and ensures the lawyers act and are accountable to the 
public interest — if the lawyers undertake all the 
judgments?
ACCOUNTABILITY
If lawyers are to retain their independence from any 
outside regulator but remain accountable in a real sense, I 
would like to suggest that the legal profession must 
operate a system of accountability in which both the 
government — the ultimate protector of the public interest 
—and the clients of lawyers have confidence over three 
matters:
(1) That the regulatory bodies for lawyers are setting and 
effectively enforcing high standards for both 
professional competence and ethical behaviour;
(2) That complaints against lawyers are being adjudicated 
in a iair and transparent wav that commands the 
confidence of the complainants; and
(3) That lawyers are not using their rights to control the 
way lawyers work to thwart proper economic 
competition or to prevent the proper development of 
the system of justice.
Having been the Minister wrestling with these issues in
o o
practice, it seems to me that these — or something like 
them—are the tests which would have to be passed to 
show that the independence of self-regulation is not being 
used to avoid accountability.
Lets us use the tests to examine whether the present 
system of regulation of lawyers by lawyers passes the test of 
being accountable in the public interest. If the regulatory 
bodies pass the tests then there is an unanswerable case 
that they should continue to hold their jurisdiction over the 
professions. If they fail the tests then it does not follow that 
independence should be removed. In that case there is 
justification for the government to step in to protect the 
public interest since, in the absence of government action, 
an unsatisfactory state of affairs will continue.
First, there is the test that the regulatory body for 
lawyers should be setting and effectively enforcing high 
standards for both professional competence and ethical 
behaviour. My experience as a lawyer is that ethical 
standards amongst UK lawyers are amongst the highest in 
the world. Ethics was drilled into my legal training at an 
early stage and the need to behave in an ethical way 
amongst constant temptations to do otherwise is a feature 
of legal life in Britain. Ethics are one area, which, whilst
o ' '
not being complacent, we can rightly say we lead the 
world.
COMPETENCE STANDARDS
Competence standards are an entirely different matter. 
There are entry standards for the Law Society and the Bar, 
but the legal world is constantly changing. New Acts of
o J o o
Parliament are passed each year and procedural changes 
like the Woolf reforms change the way the business of law 
is conducted. How can the public be confident that 
someone who qualified as a solicitor 20 years ago and 
holds himself or herself out as a lawyer working in a 
particular field is competent today to practise in that field? 
The simple answer is that the fact that the lawyer has the 
title 'solicitor' or 'barrister' is no guarantee of 
competence.
Lawyers are not the only profession struggling with this 
problem. If I may draw an analogy from medicine, in the 
old days doctors were qualified and then released to the 
world to practise. Provided they did not end up belore the 
GMC, they were allowed to continue to practise 
undisturbed until retirement. It was always said that 
doctors buried their mistakes and that the GMC struck a 
doctor off for sleeping with a patient but never for killing 
one. But this is all changing. GPs face compulsory re- 
validation — a check on their professional competence 
every few years. Surgeons are moving to have the type of 
operations they are entitled to conduct carefully 
controlled by their own Royal Colleges. The result of the 
Bristol Children's Surgery Inquiry will mean that far 
greater monitoring will take place of the outcomes of 
individual surgeons. Thus, in the medical world we can see 
that the professional regulatory bodies have moved to 
monitor the quality of their members.
In the legal world the regulators have not seen it as their 
duty" to take this step. Indeed the only effective quality 
regulation to day is the quality mark imposed by the Legal 
Services Commission. This is imposed almost exclusively 
on solicitors and, whilst it is criticised for being excessively 
bureaucratic, is the only external guarantee that the lawyer 
doing vour work is competent to do so.
REGULATORS AS 'BRAND MANAGERS'
One of the issues raised by this article is the role of 
regulators as 'brand managers'. Do the Bar Council and 
the Law Society have a role to promote barristers and
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solicitors respectively as a quality 'brand'? The alternative 
model is that the regulators exist to monitor entry 
qualifications and deal with complaints — assuming that 
any lawyer who falls below an acceptable standard will 
come to the attention of the complaints body or fail in the 
market.
But there are problems with such an approach. Firstly, 
it is reactive rather than proactive. Thus, it is not a system, 
which guarantees quality and upholds the brand, but one 
that merely responds to problems. Secondly, it assumes 
that the incompetent will come to the attention of the 
disciplinary authorities. Lawyers, especially those that deal 
with the public, know far more about the law than the 
public; only they have the skills to judge the validity of legal 
outcomes and know what it is reasonable to charge. Ino
short, they are often not dealing with informed customers.
' J o
That means that the assumption that an incompetent 
lawyer will either fail in the market or come to the 
attention of the regulator is complacent in practice.
Thirdly, even if this approach does eventually identify 
the incompetent who adversely affect the brand, there will 
be a trail of victims before the regulator can address the 
problem. Thus I would have to say that, at present, the 
legal regulators pass the first part of the first test — the 
ethical standards test — but fail the second part. And the 
irony is — for reasons I will develop later in this article- 
that the victims here are not only the public but also 
competent lawyers.
What of the second test—whether complaints against 
lawyers is being adjudicated in a fair and transparent way 
that commands the confidence of the complainants. I 
think it is fair to say that the Law Society does not have 
a good track record of dealing with complaints against its
o o 1 o
own members, with a litany of complaints both by the 
members themselves and the complainants. The 
Solicitors Complaints Bureau was a disaster and 
abolished, and the record of its replacement, the Office 
for the Supervision of Solicitors (OSS), has hardly been 
any better. I was the Minister in charge of this matter for 
two years and wrestled with varying degrees of
J J O o
commitment by the Law Society to get a grip of the 
complaints system. There was always a tension between 
those progressive elements who said that the Law Society 
had no choice as a modern regulator but to have an 
effective complaints system, and those backwoodsman 
who opposed any more of 'their money' going into the 
OSS, thought that most complaints against lawyers were 
unjustified in the first place and that having an effective 
complaints system 'would only encourage them', 
meaning more complaints and more cost to the 
profession. This tension was only resolved by the 
progressive elements pointing to the government and 
saying: 'If we don't get our house in order, the 
government will take it over and it will cost the
o
profession far more'.
COMPLAINTS
At present there are about 20,000 complaints received by 
the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors each year — that's 
about official one complaint for every five solicitors as 
opposed to one for every 22 barristers or one in every 215 
Legal Executives. The Law Society rules say that firms 
should have an internal complaints procedure and that 
complaints should be sorted out in house wherever possible. 
Thus the OSS is thus the 'Court of Appeal' for complaints.
It is hardly surprising that the lawyers' trade union finds 
it so difficult to deal with complaints about lawyers from 
members of the public. Different parts of the same body 
are trying to be prosecutor, defender and judge all in the 
same case. Is there not some irony if, within this internal 
system, the complaint is about a lawyer's failure to 
recognise a conflict of interest?
To great criticism by the Law Society and the Bar 
Council, the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 set up the 
office of the Legal Services Ombudsman. This was said by 
lawyer peers to be the end of an independent profession. 
To give you a flavour of the debates, Lord Hutchinson 
speaking of this and the proposal to widen rights of 
audience said:
The present Ombudsman, Ann Abrahams, has 
described her role as follows:
'The Ombudsman will investigate the way that your 
complaint was dealt with by the lawyer's own professional 
body'
Was that role justified or were the predictions of the 
demise of the profession accurate? Well, there are more 
than 50 per cent more practising barristers today then 
when the Act was passed and their income rose from £ 1.4 
billion to £1.6 billion last year alone. This is not a 
profession in crisis as predicted.
Lach year the Ombudsman produces a report on the 
complaints systems. In 2001 her report on the OSS said as 
follows:
'The Ombudsman was satisfied with the way in which the 
OSS handled complaints in only 57 per cent of the 1,507 
cases she investigated in 2000/2001. The OSS met the 
target set by the Lord Chancellor to reduce their outstanding 
caseload to no more than 6,000 by the end of December 
2000. Other targets for turn around times, quality of 
casework and the level of the referrals LSO were not met. The 
OSS is on course to meet some but not all of its targets for 
2001. The Law Society has implemented a radical package 
of reform of their governance^ and management structure. 
However, there has been disappointingly slow progress in the 
development of their proposed new complaints redress scheme 
- which was billed as a cornerstone of the Society's plans to 
become a "model regulator'".
But it is not the case that a self-regulatory body cannot 
run complaints. The Ombudsman investigated 159
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allegations about the Bar Council's handling of complaints 
in 2000/2001 and found no cause for criticism or 
recommendation in 94 per cent of cases. For the most 
part she concluded the Bar Council continue to be
'thorough and focused in their investigations, coherent and 
consistent in their decision making and administratively efficient'. 
She also commended the Bar Council for starting to make
o
use of their new powers to award compensation for poor 
service, which came into force in May 2000.
Would these changes have come about with government 
action in the 1990 Act and further reserve powers in the 
Access to Justice Act 1999? I suspect not.
Whilst the OSS still has a long way to go, this exampleo j o 7 r
shows that there can be a mix of independent regulation 
and government supervision without infringing any 
constitutional rights. What should happen if the OSS fails 
to deliver a satisfactory service in the future? How many 
years can go by with stinging criticism from the Legal 
Services Ombudsman?
There are two choices. Option one is that the LSO is 
given powers to fine the profession for failing to operate a 
proper complaints system — the solution inserted into the 
Access to Justice Act 1999. The second option is that a 
government appointed body — consisting of both lawyers 
and non-lawyers — takes over the administration and 
adjudication of complaints. The first option is, in my view, 
a short-term solution, which will only lead to conflict with 
the professions, and arguments that the money that should 
be used to improve complaints is going in fines. If the 
government wants a solution to this as opposed to a 
further period of conflict, the second option is the only 
viable way forward. The Law Society is — to use an 
overused cliche — drinking in the last chance saloon on
o
complaints. It is their job to get this disorderly house in 
order, and if it does not happen very soon I would expect 
their licence to be revoked.
'PROPER' ACCOUNTABILITY
Next, I would like to look at the third 'accountability' 
test. It must be right to ask whether lawyers are usingo J o
their ability to control the way lawyers work to thwart 
proper economic competition or to prevent the proper 
development of the system of justice. The key word here 
is 'proper'. The maintenance of professional standards 
means that lawyers must work to a code ol conduct. 
There is a different code for solicitors and barristers — 
which is entirely right given the different jobs they do. 
These restrictions are there to protect the public and the 
integrity of the system of justice. They ensure that lawyers 
do not mislead the court or take advantage of their 
clients.
But what happens if the rules of the Bar or the Law 
Society prevent lawyers in working in a way that may 
benefit clients? What if the rules prevent proper economic 
competition between lawyers or act to entrench the
commercial interests of either barristers or law firms?
This is an area where the Law Society and the Bar 
Council act both as regulators of the profession and as 
trade unions for lawyers, combining their roles in an 
almost schizophrenic way. The present arrangements 
mean, in the world of lawyers and their clients, it is the 
lawyers who have judged what is and is not in the client's 
interest.
In 1978 a group of eight young barristers published a 
book called 'The Bar on Trial'. The coversheet said:
'In this book,Jbr the first time, a group ojeight barristers 
have broken a tradition of silence and spoken out against the 
shortcomings and injustices of their profession.'
One of the complaints was about pupillage, complaining 
that in 1976 family connections continued to be the single most 
method of arranging pupillage''. The economic effect of 
limiting entry to those with family connections was, I 
suggest, obvious and detrimental. The Bar has come a long00 ' o
way towards being a meritocracy since then but only in the 
last few weeks has another suggestion in the book — the
oo
payment of all pupils — been made compulsory.
However given that the judiciary today are largely 
chosen from the practising bar that entered the profession 
at about that time, it could be said that the legacy of bad 
practices stays with us for a long time. A young barrister 
called Jonathan Caplan — now a distinguished silk — wrote 
an incisive chapter on the criminal Bar. He complained 
that the Bar did not make its voice heard on law reform 
issues and said:
'indhddual barristers have done a lot of good work for justice 
but, so far as the Bar itself is concerned, it is not too cynical 
to say that in general it only enters the political arena when 
its own financial interests are threatened.'
Whilst that is no longer exclusively true, as a Minister I 
found that energetic and determined lobbying by lawyers 
on matters of principle almost invariably occurred where 
the assertion of principles followed their own financial 
interest. We saw this over the Mode of Trial Bill, where 
they fought a modest proposal that the defendant in a 
criminal trial should not go forum shopping as being the 
removal of the right to trial. Removing jury trials over 
minor shoplifting offences for criminals with a string of 
existing convictions would have reduced work for lawyers 
— and was opposed on principle. The principled stance of 
the Bar and the Law Society was 'leave the issue to Lord 
Justice Auld'. When he came back with even more radical 
proposals they were in turn attacked.
I took the Mode of Trial Bill through the House of
o
Commons with my colleague, Charles Clarke. I can 
honestly sav we won the intellectual argument on this — 
but the misrepresentation of the proposals in public was 
legion. We have seen this again recently. In a careful speech 
Sir John Stevens, speaking on behalf of ACPO, said:
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'There have been no less than Jour Royal Commissions and 
Criminal Justice Reviews that have sought to change the 
system in the last 20 years (Philips, Roskill, Runciman and 
Auld). But each time, the entrenched interests ojothers have 
ensured that changes that are recommended and promised by 
successive governments are never carried through and the 
game continues and expands.
The veryjact that the criminal trial process is seen as a game 
is in itself debilitating to the notion of honesty, morality and 
getting at the truth. And the impact is not only on the 
victims, the witnesses and local communities but also on 
offenders themselves'.
He continued:
'In his Criminal Courts Review last year, Lord Justice Auld said, 
"A criminal trial is not a game under which the guilty 
defendant should be provided with a sporting chance. It is a 
search Jor the truth. The right of silence is to protect the 
innocent from wrongly incriminating themselves, not to enable 
the guilty, byjouling up the criminal process to make it as 
procedurally difficult as possible Jor the prosecution to prove their 
guilt regardless of the cost and disruption to others involved.'
I believe Auld has got it absolutely right. But then so did 
Runciman in 1993 when he said, "Justice is made a 
mockery when a guilty person walks free because technical 
loop holes have been exploited, prosecution witnesses 
wrongly discredited, jurors improperly influenced or 
victims intimidated." Roskill said much the same thing in 
1986, and Philips before him in 1981 in the report of the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure.
'Time and time again, report after report, tells us that the 
criminal justice system is in dire need of sweeping reform. 
Just as the police service is, we are at the leading edge, we 
are not frightened of reform'.
Responding, David Bean, Chairman of the Bar Council 
said:
'We've heard some extreme claims Jrom the police in recent 
days. It's time to inject some balance into the debate. None 
of us want a police state, where the knee-jerk response to a 
crime is to "round up the usual suspects", as in the film 
Casablanca. We've seen too many miscarriages of justice Jor 
that. But if we did unbalance the scales of justice we would, 
before long, be on the slippery slope to a police state'.
If that was a response from a trade union, it might be 
forgivable. One can understand why a trade union's only 
interest is to protect the interests of its members. But the 
response from a regulatory body should be different. It is 
no answer to the serious issues raised by the police to say 
'none of us want a police state'. That is not the point in a 
democracy and David Bean. The complaint from the 
police was that the reports of Royal Commissions and 
independent judges were blocked by the sectional interest 
of lawyers, which coincided with their financial interests. 
It's no answer to attack the police — what Sir Humphrey
would have called a 'playing the man not the ball'. The 
response from the Bar Council failed to address the 
serious issues raised by the police and — I speak as a 
barrister - was embarrassingly naive.
I am no longer a government minister and do not speak 
on behalf of the government, but this shows if lawyers 
want to be taken seriously by government, they might like 
to stop acting like old fashioned trade unionists. This 
intemperate outburst was a modern example of the 
tendency identified so long ago by Jonathan Caplan — only 
speaking when lawyers' financial interests were 
threatened.
Even before Enron there was some nervousness 
amongst the Eaw Society and Bar that, as the legal 
regulators of the wray lawyers could work, they were 
coming under fire like never before. They found that fire 
was coming from some unexpected angles. Several 
examples come to mind. For example, the Eaw Society on 
numerous public interest grounds fiercely resisted the 
breaking of the solicitors' conveyancing monopoly in the 
1980s. The objections to the private members' Bill 
brought by Great Grimsby MI^ Austin Mitchell, to create 
licensed conveyancers were many and detailed.
What has been the effect of these conveyancing 
reforms? Well not, as predicted, a flood of householders 
up and down the country that only own half the house or 
no right of way down the garden. In fact the number of 
registered conveyancers is tiny but the price of 
conveyancing has fallen considerably so that we no\v have 
some of the lowest conveyancing costs in Europe — still 
the slowest, but that is another story
Equally, the debate over whether it was in the public 
interest for barristers to maintain their monopoly to rights 
of audience in the high courts drew responses, which took 
the form of self-interest dressed up as public interest. 
Speaking in the House of Eords about the modest reforms 
proposed in the Courts and Eegal Services Bill in 1989, 
Eord Ackner predicted the demise of the Bar. In fact the 
practising Bar — as I noted above — has grown by more 
than 50 per cent.
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
But the Government's squeeze on the regulators does 
not stop at the ECD. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), 
the provisional wing of the Treasury, is gearing itself for a 
major fight with the legal and accountancy professions. Its 
March 2001 report, Competition in the Professions, pulls no 
punches. The opening paragraph stirred up a hornets' 
nest when it said:
'Restrictions on supply in the case ojprofessional services just 
as with other goods and services, will tend to drive up costs 
and prices, limit access and choice and cause customers to 
receive poorer value Jor money than they would under 
properly competitive conditions.'
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The OFT's Director General, John Vickers, observed 
there were perennial concerns relating to the professions, 
and said ominously that 'significant restrictions remain 
which may very well not be justified'. Any doubt that the 
director general was deeply under-whelmed bv the Law 
Society and the Bar Council was dispelled by paragraph 
10, which concluded: 'Indeed, jhe professions are run by 
producers largely for the benefit ofproducers .' But it did lead to 
one of the most remarkable radio interviews ever on the 
Today programme, as Roy Amlot QC, chair of the Bar 
Council, attacked the OFT - for not taking account of the 
public interest.
What are these heinous crimes of which the Law- 
Society and the Bar Council stand accused? Well, it is 
mostly about putting restrictions on the ways their own 
members deliver services, to the detriment of innovation 
and competition. There are also specific complaints, like 
the position of QCs. It is hardly surprising that the QC 
system comes in for a bashing. With the greatest respect 
to those who have made it to the front row, it needs the 
skills of a silk to justify the system whereby the 
Government picks out private sector lawyers for 
distinction, giving them a licence to load the fee notes. 
The OFT said the QC system distorts competition and 
'changes in the process are desirable', which is nearly as 
damning as the measured language of the OFT can get.
The Bar Council set up a committee to respond. The 
committee of 11 contained one solicitor — Lord Philips of 
Sudbury whose conservative views on legal reform were 
already well known — one economist alreadv working for
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the Bar Council, and nine barristers. The report produced 
by the Bar Council is thus produced from an entirely 
supplier viewpoint — about the public interest in how that 
supply should be conducted. Was the quality of the 
response reduced because there were no representatives of 
clients sitting around the table?
The response from the Bar Council essentially 
recommended 'no change' in the existing system — with 
some good arguments and some fairly hopeless ones. The 
quality of arguments is not the point here. The question is 
whether anyone can accept that the public policy 
arguments being advanced were principally serving the 
financial interests of die profession or wider interests 
policy interests.
But more serious for corporate lawyers were the 
questions raised about the rules that lawyers could only 
work for clients when they are in partnerships, could not 
share risks with third parties and so on. Why, the OFT 
asked, are employed lawyers are only allowed to work for 
their employers, and not their employers' clients?
Now that is a good question. Why should an assistant
solicitor in a mega law firm with hundreds of partners, 
which is either incorporated or has limited liability under 
the rules of the New York Bar (to take a neutral example), 
be able to act for clients whereas that same solicitor 
working for a limited company where the directors are not 
lawyers is prevented from doing so? George Bernard Shaw 
said that 'all professions, are conspiracies against the laity', 
and the rule that only lawyers can sit at the top table looks 
very much like a conspiracy to the OFT.
Is the OFT report a slippery slope leading to legal 
advice being offered to Sainsbury's customers along with 
banking, vegetables and a takeaway biriani? Well, the 
banks and the insurance brokers cannot complain that the 
supermarkets are moving into financial services; they have 
to compete. The takeaway cannot complain either, and 
must compete or go out of business. Lawyers see legal 
services as being entirely different; but is that a defensible 
argument?
That brings us to one of the great weaknesses of the 
present regulatory system. There is no general legal 
restriction on anyone offering legal advice in this country. 
No one can advertise as a 'solicitor' without a practising 
certificate, but apart from very limited areas of work such 
as conveyancing, conducting cases in court, or probate, 
any Tom Dick or Harry can set up shop in the high street 
to provide legal advice. You do not need to be insured, 
professionally regulated or even have any qualifications to 
offer legal services to the unsuspecting public.
Provided that lawyers do not stray into the limited areas 
where there are statutory restrictions on practice — and 
these form a tiny part of most commercial legal practices 
— it is open to lawyers to send their practising certificates 
back to the Law Society and carry on working in an 
entirely unregulated way, provided they do not fall foul of 
the Financial Services Authority in the way they handle 
financial issues. In practice, that is what accountancy and 
consulting firms are increasingly doing, whether the Law 
Society and the Bar Council likes it or not.
Thus the greatest challenge to the Law Society and to a 
lesser extent the Bar is that lawyers will pick up their bat 
and ball and simply stop playing the game, voting with 
their feet to move away from the profession. In the late 
1980s estate agents gave up their independence and sold 
out to the multiples. Most made a pile of money and, five 
years on, bought back the businesses for a song. What is to 
stop lawyers doing the same thing?
One firm, Statham Gill Davies, has already gone down 
that road, giving up practising certificates for £lm-plus 
per partner from business services group Tenon. With
paydays like that it does not take a crystal ball to suggest 
that they will not be the last firm to sell out.
Apart from anything else, having regulations which 
force law firms to operate as partnerships requires them to 
operate in, arguably, the worst possible way to run a 
modern business. Bringing in outside capital to improve 
efficiency is nigh on impossible because of the lack of any 
permissible risk sharing. Incentivising the staff with share 
options is impossible because there are no shares. Anyone 
who is not a practising solicitor cannot be a full partner, is 
a second-class employee and, however valuable to the 
business, cannot be of equal worth.
So where does all this leave the poor old regulators? 
They only have two choices. They can either trv to force 
the Government to legislate so that anyone who provides 
legal services is forced to work under a regulated umbrella, 
or they can set out to compete openly with the 
unregulated market. Legislation to require all legal advice 
to be given by advisors under a regulated body is, I 
suspect, a total non-starter. Defining 'legal' advice is 
virtually impossible.
The Government set up the Blackwell Committee in 
1998 in response to the horror stories put about by 
lawyers about personal injury claims assessors and 
unqualified employment advisors. When the committee 
came to report it found a startling lack of evidence to 
support the claims of abuse, and even some support 
among clients for the user-friendly way in wrhich non- 
lawyers gave advice. Despite the presence of so many 
lawyers on the panel, in effect, they recommended very 
little change.
But how do the professions compete? Faced with 
pressures on all sides the only way forward is improving 
the 'brand identity' of regulated lawyers. That means 
driving up quality so a customer of a regulated lawyer 
can have confidence that the service level will be sky 
high (as opposed to the charges). It may be the only 
route to ensuring that lawyers will want to remain as 
solicitors or barristers because the brand has a 
commercial value that merely being a 'lawyer' does not. 
But — and there is always a but — that means facing 
some tough decisions.
The chain of quality of the brand is only as strong as its 
weakest link. Retraining is all verv well, but in the medicalO J '
world, GPs are facing compulsory re-validation. Will the 
trade union role of the Law Society or the Bar prevent 
them grasping this nettle? Moving those who fail out of 
practice will undoubtedly improve the quality of the
brand, but it is antithetical to the trade union impulses of 
the Law Society and the Bar Council, which brings us 
directly back to the question of whether a single body can 
be a union and a regulator.
It is a tough call, but there is little point in aggressively 
publicising the 'brand' solicitor when, at one end of the 
profession, one in five solicitors receives a formal 
complaint each year and, at the other end, competent 
firms are selling up and getting out. May I come back to 
the third test, and ask whether the response to the lawyers 
are not using their rights to control the way lawyers work 
to thvvart proper economic competition or to prevent the 
proper development of the system of justice. This Is a 
matter of opinion, and mine is slightly affected by being 
the target of their wrath of the lawyers every time anything 
was proposed which affected their wallets.
However, at present I would have to say that the Law 
Society is showing real efforts to meet the public interest 
test and is driving forward change to the benefit of itso o
members. For the first time for many years the Law 
Society recognises that it cannot — like King Canute — stop 
the wraves of change. In contrast my own regulator, the Bar 
Council — well the least said the better.
The key question is — where do we go with regulation 
in the future? There are, in my view, only two options. 
Either legal regulators take a long, hard and cold look at 
their operations and, when they take any decision, have a 
placard in front of them which says T represent the public 
and our clients, not the suppliers', or they will give 
government increasing justification for taking away or 
circumscribing their independence. Government will find 
it impossible not to respond to the pressure to act.
In some areas — complaints with the Bar and OFT with 
the Law Society — there has been a sea change in attitude. 
But the key test is whether, when public interest and 
financial interest come into conflict, the latter will 
prevail. The evidence to date on that is far from 
encouraging.
David Lock
This article is based on a lecture given at the I LAS on 
14 March 2002.®
